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Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street
Policing
Jeffrey Fagan*
Amanda Geller†
Columbia University
Abstract
Regulation of Terry stops of pedestrians by police requires articulation of the reasonable
and individualized bases of suspicion that motivate their actions. Nearly five decades
after Terry, courts have found it difficult to articulate the boundaries or parameters of
reasonable suspicion. The behavior and appearances of individuals combine with the
social and spatial contexts where police observe them to create an algebra of suspicion.
Police can proceed to approach and temporarily detain a person at a threshold of
suspicion that Courts have been unable and perhaps unwilling to articulate. The result
has been sharp tensions within Fourth Amendment doctrine as to what is reasonable,
why, and in what circumstances. The jurisprudence of suspicion is no clearer today than
it was in the aftermath of Terry. This issue has taken center stage in both litigation and
policy debates on the legality of the Stop and Frisk policing regime in New York. Under
this regime, police record the bases of suspicion using both a menu of codified stop
rationales with supplemental text narratives to record their descriptions of suspicious
behaviors or circumstances that produced actionable suspicion.
Evidence from 4.4 million stops provide an empirical basis to assess the revealed
preferences of police officers as to the bases for these Terry stops and identify narratives
of suspicion that justify their actions beyond the idiosyncrasies of the individual case.
First, we identify patterns of articulated suspicion. Next, we show the individual factors
and social conditions that shape how those patterns are applied. We also show how
patterns evolve over time and become clearer and more refined across a wide range of
police stops. That refinement seems to follow the capacious interpretative room created
by Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Next, we assess the extent of constitutional
compliance and examine the neighborhood and individual factors that predict noncompliance. The results suggest that the observed patterns of narratives have evolved
into shared narratives or scripts of suspicion, and that these patterns are specific to
suspect race and neighborhood factors. We conclude that scripts are expressions of the
norms within the everyday organizational exercise of police discretion and that these
scripts defeat the requirement of individualization inherent in caselaw governing Fourth
Amendment stops.
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Following the Script: Narratives of Suspicion in Terry Stops in Street
Policing‡
Jeffrey Fagan*
Amanda Geller†
I. Introduction
A. Double Power
In 2011, the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agabem offered a useful dichotomy in
thinking about the way that state power operates.1 In one version, this power
seeks to limit our freedoms to engage in certain behaviors that may produce social
harms. It’s obvious that state power invests police with the authority to sanction
such prohibited behaviors. But this form of social control can work both sides of
the divide between offenders and law enforcers. State power also limits the ways
in which legal authorities can perform those tasks. The state does this through a
complicated regulatory regime – enforced primarily by the courts but also through
methods of democratic and political regulation – that covers virtually all aspects
of police power.
But there is another form of state power that works somewhat differently: it limits
what legal authorities can not do. In the modern era of proactive policing, we
place obligations on the police to take steps to intercede with people and
situations when they perceive risks or realities of criminal activity. These
obligations may trump their traditional discretion, and lead to action when they
might otherwise choose to use less intrusive or coercive forms of their authority.
At stake in this second version of power is not so much what police can do, but
the limits on their capacity not to make use of their power. This double power has
created tensions in modern policing that have spilled over in the past decade in
litigation over the authority of the police to intervene with citizens and detain –
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1
Giorgio Agamben, “Su ci. che possiamo non fare,” in Nudit. (Rome: Nottetempo,
2009), 67–70 (trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella, “On What We Can Not Do,” in
Nudities [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011], 43–45).
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seize – them for questioning without either reasonable suspicion or probable
cause.
The modern regulatory apparatus for regulating these tensions is the Fourth
Amendment. Its modern expression first appeared in Terry v. Ohio, where the
U.S. Supreme Court lowered the standard for a police intervention from probable
cause to a newer and proceduralized concept of reasonable and articulable
suspicion.2 On the surface, Terry’s goals were simple: determine a set of
procedural rules that would both control discretion and at the same time promote
fairness while avoiding the temptations of extra-legal police encounters that had
produced a series of cases constraining police behavior in the same era.3 Terry
created a very difficult balancing act for police officers and their supervisors:
safeguard the interests of citizens from unwarranted invasions of their privacy or
liberty, while imposing restrictions on those freedoms in the interest of
maintaining security and controlling crime.4
Terry’s rules were the reasonableness core of the new regime governing what
police can do: the rules told police what they can do and when, and provided the
minimum conditions to justify their actions. The rules sought to carve out a space
for exercising discretion for reasonable incursions by police on liberty. The
doctrine was part of larger social and legal project to constrain police power in a
way that made it politically and constitutionally accountable, particularly when
used against those who often were most often the objects of police intervention.
Under Terry, the police are required to articulate specific indicia of suspicion, and
that those indicia be sufficiently salient to justify police action.
Modern policing creates a second tension: animating practices that tell police
what they can not do. Policies such as proactive policing,5 order maintenance

2

392 U.S. 1 (1968)
Mapp v Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972). See, generally, the essays in the SYMPOSIUM ON TERRY, 30 YEARS LATER, 72 St.
John’s Law Review, Summer-Fall 1998.
4
John Q. Barrett, Deciding the Stop and Frisk Cases: A Look Inside the Supreme Court’s
Conference, 72 St. John’s Law Review 749, 838-9 (1998) (concluding that “[m]any thus
think of Terry and the law of ‘stop and frisk’ as … a sensible balancing of public
interests in law enforcement against relatively lesser intrusions on personal freedom, and
a measure of constitutional justification –‘reasonable suspicion’ - that police officers on
the street, and also courts evaluating police conduct after the fact, can use effectively in
deciding whether a particular intrusion is constitutionally permitted.”)
5
For descriptions of proactive policing, see e.g., Charis E. Kubrin, et. al., Proactive
Policing and Robbery Rates Across U.S. Cities, 48 Criminology 57 (2010); Jacqueline
Cohen and Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in Evaluating Gun Policy: Effects on
Crime and Violence (Philip J. Cook and Jens Ludwig, eds) 217-239 (2003); Robert J.
3
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policing,6 and stop and frisk,7 encourage if not incentivize or even demand that
police interdict and temporarily seize citizens based on thin bases of suspicion.
For example, in a recorded stop in New York in 2010, a young man named Alvin
asks an officer why he had stopped him. The officer said “because you keep
looking back at us.”8 Alvin’s stop is an example of the narrowing of discretion by
police officers to take action based less on the articulable signs of suspicion than
on the very “hunches” or “inchoate or unparticularized suspicion” that Terry
abhorred.9 Alvin’s stop is a long way from the scenario envisioned by the Terry
court of interdiction when “crime is afoot.” The policy of stops under a wide net
of suspicion, and its enforcement in urban police regimes, tells police what they
can not do: exercise discretion to avoid contact when suspicion is weak.
Administratively, the demand for a steady flow of stops creates sanctions for
police whose activity falls below the new benchmark.10

Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication
and Theoretical Extension, 22 Law and Society Review 163-189 (1988).
6
Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing. 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1997); Bernard E. Harcourt,
Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence,
The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97
Michigan Law Review 291 (1998).
7
Tracey L. Meares, The Social Science of Stop and Frisk, Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. (2014,
forthcoming); David Keenan, and Tina M. Thomas, An Offense-Severity Model for Stopand-Frisks, 123 Yale LJ 1448 (2014); K. Babe Howell, From Page to Practice and Back
Again: Broken Windows Policing and the Real Costs to Law-Abiding New Yorkers of
Color, 34 NYU Rev. L. & Soc. Change 439 (2010).
8
Ross Tuttle & Rein Schneider, Stopped-and-Frisked: ‘For Being a F**king Mutt’
[VIDEO], THE NATION, Oct. 8, 2012, at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=7rWtDMPaRD8. When
the officer asks Alvin Cruz why he kept looking back at them, he said it was because they
had just stopped him a few minutes earlier. Cruz also said that he had been stopped many
times, and was hyper-vigilant and fearful when he was walking in public and spotted
officers. Later on during the encounter, one of the two officers on the scene asks Cruz if
he wants to go to jail. When Cruz asks why the officers are threatening to arrest him, and
one replies: “For being a fucking mutt! You know that?”
9
Terry at __
10
In New York, for example, there were strong institutional pressures beginning in 2001
to increase the number of Terry stops as a prophylactic measure against crime. The
pressures included threats of sanctions for officers whose “productivity” was low, based
on the evaluations of their supervising sergeants. See, Graham A. Rayman, The NYPD
Tapes: A Shocking Story of Cops, Cover-Ups, and Courage (2013) (showing how police
supervisors threatened officers with workplace sanctions if they did not meet quotas for
stops and arrests). See, also, John Del Signore, Police Union Delegate Caught on Tape
Demanding Cops Meet Quotas, The Gothamist, March 19, 2013, at
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This essay examines how officers form and apply suspicion under the conditions
of both an expansion of the original Terry design11 but in policy regimes that
narrow the discretion to act on promiscuously formed notions of suspicion.
Through the expansion of the constitutional bases for permissible street
interventions, coupled with the narrowing of discretion to not act, officers have
developed recurring narratives or scripts of suspicion to satisfy administrative
review of their actions within the programs of their departments, and the rare
instances when there are constitutional challenges to contemporary practices. We
begin with a discussion of the intersection of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
doctrine and the social psychology of scripted behaviors. We then examine the
development of such scripts in the context of New York City’s aggressive “Stop
Question and Frisk” (SQF) policing regime, focusing on the recent decade leading
to recent constitutional litigation and a court order mandating regulatory
reforms.12
B. Suspicion
The permitted bases for police action evolved over four decades through a series
of U.S. Supreme Court cases that extended Terry’s reach and inflated its originally
narrow concept of individualized and reasonable suspicion.13 Neither courts nor
social scientists know very much about how officers really form suspicion, how
they crystallize specific behaviors to reach a threshold of actionable suspicion,
and for which groups of persons that suspicion most often arises. Race
complicates the mix, because of the particular social and neighborhood contexts

http://gothamist.com/2013/03/19/police_union_delegate_caught_on_tap.php (citing
statements taped by Officer Adil Polanco at roll call in his police precinct, and who was
the victim of retaliation from his superiors for publicly revealing the quota demands).
11
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 11-12, Terry V. Ohio 362 U.S. 1
(1968), articulating that police should consider before conducting a “street stop” or “field
interrogation.”
12
For discussions of the history and practice of the SQF regime, see: Jeffrey Bellin, The
Inverse Relationship between the Constitutionality and Effectiveness of New York City
'Stop and Frisk', 94 B.U. L. Rev. ___ (2014); Tracey Meares, Stop and Frisk, supra note _;
David A. Harris, Across the Hudson: Taking the Stop and Frisk Debate Beyond the
Hudson, N.Y.U. Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 2014 (forthcoming); Franklin
E. Zimring, The City that Became Safe: New York’s Lessons for Urban Crime and Its
Control (2011).
13
William Stuntz, Terry’s Impossibility, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 1213, 1213-15 (1998)
(arguing that any attempt to legally regulate street policing is prone to error since courts
are incapable of systematically taking into account the realities of why the police
detained a suspect).
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in which police have contacts with non-whites.14 The possibility that the
construction of suspicion for street encounters also varies by race, net of other
factors.15 In other words, what appears suspicious to the average police officer
about the behavior of a Black person may be less suspicious or even neutral for a
White.16
The reality of the formation of suspicion may in fact be far simpler than the Terry
court envisioned. Jerome Skolnick, riding with police in the wake of the 1960s
riots in American cities, identified the archetype of the symbolic assailant that
police called on to decide whom to put under their gaze: the person who used
certain gestures, language or wore certain attire that police saw as predicates of
criminal violence.17 Police often responded to these vague indicators of crime
risk by tightening scrutiny and, when possible, conducting “field interrogations.”18
John Van Maanen conducted several ethnographic studies of the police, noting
that police classify people into three categories: “suspicious persons,” or those
who police have a reason to believe may have committed a serious offense,
“assholes”, or those who do not accept the police definition of the situation and
fail to give deference to the police, and “know nothings,” or those who are not
from either of the first two categories but are not police and therefore cannot
understand what police do or why they do it.19 Suspicious persons in particular
were recognizable by their appearance and behavior in public areas, especially
distinguished by their furtive and non-routine movements.
Carl Klockars identified element of police culture that lead to collective
definitions of suspicion, again including “furtiveness” and being “out of place,”
but these were inchoate and highly subjective accounts from the officers he
observed.20 Rod Bruson and Ronald Weitzer also showed how being out of place
14

See, e.g., David S. Kirk, The Neighborhood Context of Racial and Ethnic Disparities In
Arrest, 45 Demography 55 (2008) (showing empirically that social context in explains
racial and ethnic disparities in arrest, and that the race-specific social and political
features of neighborhood residential patterns explain variations in criminal outcomes.)
15
Floyd v. City of New York, Opinion and Order at 2, August 13, 2012.
16
The example of looking into cars demonstrates this.
17
Jerome Skolnick, Justice Without Trial XX (1966).
18
Id. Skolnick cites an article by Thomas Adams, a “criminal justice professional,”
summarizing the characteristics of which persons are suspicious enough to merit a field
interrogation: automobiles that do not “look right,” persons out of place, known troublemakers, persons who evade or avoid the officer, persons wearing a pea coat on a hot day,
persons near a crime scene, people who are visibly rattled by a policeman.
19
John van Maanen, The Asshole, in Policing: A View from the Street , 221(Peter K.
Manning and John van Maanen, eds.) 1978.
20
Carl Klockars, The Idea of the Police (1985)
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and defying racial boundaries aroused police suspicion and at times, verbal and
physical aggression by police.21
Direct observation also provided some evidence on how officers form suspicion
in situ. Analyzing notes from researcher-observers during ride-alongs, Geoffrey
Alpert and his colleagues showed that police are more likely to view a minority
citizen as suspicious–leading to a police stop–based on non-behavioral cues –
location, associations, appearances – while relying more often on behavioral cues
to develop suspicion for white citizens.22 Jon Gould and Stephen Mastrofski also
analyzed ride-along data from a mid-size city, and concluded that officers based
nearly half their stops on constitutionally insufficient criteria.23 Their analysis
only examined Fourth Amendment sufficiency without elaborating on the
narratives across the limited number of events in their sample. Bernard Harcourt
went deeper into the Gould-Mastrofski data to show how an institutional “account
of policing” at the intersection of drug profiling with community policing helped
create narratives that shaped decision making with respect to whom to stop and
how the stop should unfold.24

21

Rod K. Brunson and Ronald Weitzer, Police Relations with Black and White Youths in
Different Neighborhoods, Urban Affairs Review 858, 868 (2009). See, also, Rod K.
Brunson and Jody Miller, Young Black Men and Urban Policing in the United States, 46
British Journal of Criminology 613-640 (2006); Carmen Solis et al., Latino Youths’
Experiences with and Perceptions of Involuntary Police Encounters, 623 Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 39-51 (2009); Victor Rios, Punished:
Policing the Lives of Black and Latino Boys (2011) (showing how adaptive styles of
resistance to unfair police encounters impedes desistance from crime and the social
mobility needed to escape criminogenic settings).
22
Geoffrey P. Alpert, John M. MacDonald, and Roger G. Dunham, Police Suspicion and
Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43 Criminology 407 (2005)
(showing that a suspect’s location and social status influences an officer’s decision to
form non-behavioral versus behavioral suspicion).
23
Jon Gould and Stephen Mastrofski, Suspect Searches: Assess Police Behavior Under
the U.S. Constitution, 3 Criminology and Public Policy 315 (2004) (showing that officers
violated Fourth Amendment standards for both stops and searches in 45% of a sample of
XXX cases, based on ratings of researcher-generated narratives by a panel of defense
lawyers, prosecutors and retired judges).
24
Bernard Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility, 3
Criminology & Public Policy 363 (2004) (describing how community policing officers
invoked a drug enforcement rationale to stop a suspect without any indicia of drug use or
possession, and proceeded to conduct a fruitless strip and cavity search.) Showing the
tension between accuracy and suspicion, the officers concluded the search by saying to
the observer that they were certain that the suspect was holding drugs, despite failing to
find any in his clothing or on his person or in his person.
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In recent years, case law has expanded the logic and substance of reasonable
suspicion. For example, Wardlow broadened the boundaries of suspicion to allow
consideration of presence in a “high crime area.” 25 But Wardlow and other
cases26 left unsettled exactly what a high crime area is, and how police were to
factor location into more behavioral indicia of suspicion such as “casing.” In fact,
there is no consensus as to how much suspicion is needed to justify a seizure. Nor
are there substantive indicia as to what behaviors or factors matter, only that these
indicia be reasonable. In a dissent in Naverette, Justice Scalia suggested that an
outcomes test – a regime of suspicion passes constitutional muster if the police
are “right” in one of 20 stops via an arrest –might sort out the dilemma over how
much suspicion is necessary and what sorts.27 A similar outcomes test was
considered in Floyd to claim that the police were so often wrong in the bases of
suspicion for their stops that those bases were faulty.28
Telling police what they can not do with respect to stops has pushed the
boundaries of both reasonableness and suspicion beyond what the Terry court
may have envisioned as a set of workable rules implemented by experienced
police. There is no clear standard as to what types and levels of suspicion that
courts demand (or should demand) in police encounters. The configuration of
Terry and its progeny tends to assume that there is a threshold of suspicion that
renders police action constitutionally permissible. Suspicion in this formulation
25

Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000). See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt and Tracey
L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, supra note __. See, also, Bernard
E. Harcourt, “Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties,
and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally,” 71 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1275, 1292 (2004); Sherry F. Colb, Innocence, Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1456 (1996); William Stuntz, “Terry’s
Impossibility,” supra note __; Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of
Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551
(1997).
26
While officer testimony is often used to establish than area has a high incidence of
criminal activity, the Ninth Circuit has held that “more than mere war stories are required
to establish the existence of a high-crime area” and that district courts must “examine
with care the specific data underlying any such assertion.” United States v. MonteroCamargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1139 n.32 (9th Cir. 2000). See also United States v. Bonner,
363 F.3d 213, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2004)(Smith, J., concurring)(discussing possible burdens
of proof in establishing an area is “high-crime”).
27
In Navarette v. California, Justice Scalia suggested that an accuracy or “hit” rate of
between 5% and 10% would be indicative of reasonable suspicion in a pattern of
stops. Navarette v. California, No. 12-9490, 2014 BL 111267 (U.S. Apr. 22, 2014) at 11.
According to Scalia, absent a showing at that order of magnitude, the basis of suspicion is
not reasonable.
28
See, Floyd v City of NewYork, Opinion and Order, supra note __.
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becomes a hurdle model, or a binary category, where the stop is either
constitutional or it’s not.29 Courts worry more than police about whether there is
“enough” suspicion to get over that bar satisfies the “individualized” suspicion test.
But the bar or hurdle itself has become a moving target with succeeding Fourth
Amendment opinions, as is the “enough” standard.30 Suspicion now is highly
contextualized in local conditions.
So, the determination of suspicion, and whether the quantity of suspicion is
enough suspicion to motivate action, is now about subjective and probabilistic
assessments in those circumstances that, in Terry’s language, “crime is afoot.”31 It
has become the application of ex ante factors of what suspicion ought to look like
to a particular circumstance. Those who would regulate the use of these standards
have to apply good faith assumptions that the officer is accurately reconstructing
the triggers and clues that move her action beyond merely a hunch. Contemporary
standards don’t really tell a police officer doing modern police work32 how much
suspicion is “enough” to satisfy constitutional standards. Officers are left to the
extremes of roll-call training on the one hand and litigation challenges on the
other to define a space where their actions comport with the shifting territory of
the Fourth Amendment.33
Even when officers do articulate the bases of suspicion, it’s often recorded after
the fact: when the contact is resolved one way or another, after an interaction has
taken place which may create some cognitive baggage that carries over, after
there has been some level of emotional arousal, often in the company of peers and
supervisors who may weigh in on the interaction,34 and after the bases of
“suspicion” have been validated or not. Telescoping and other cognitive
29

Harcourt and Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amendment, supra note _.
See, Tracey Meares, Programming Errors, in this volume.
31
Terry at __
32
Proactive policing instantiates the notions of criminal archetypes by encouraging police
interdiction with persons who they decide could be committing a crime, albeit without
explicit markers or indicia of suspicion. It anticipates the one-off intervention into a
crime in progress in the Terry case. See; Charis Kubrin et al., Proactive Policing, supra
note _. See, also, Meares, Programming Errors, in this volume.
33
One of my students, a former NYPD officer who was assigned to a special patrol
designed to maximize stop activity in a high crime area, confided in me that his time in
law school convinced him that much of what he learned about the Fourth Amendment in
rookie training and roll call refreshers was wrong.
34
See, “Mutt” video, supra note __. The sergeant could be heard in the background at
several points over the course of the stop urging the other officer to escalate the tension
between Alvin and the officer by interpreting Alvin’s responses as challenging to the
officer’s authority.
30
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distortions all come into play as officers try not only to reconstruct their own
thinking but to accurately portray the actions and settings of an individual in a
moment of salience if not arousal.
So, how much can we trust the accuracy and neutrality of these ‘accounts’ of
perception, cognition and decision making? It’s hard to come up with a clear
answer to this, since other than real-time recording, there is little opportunity for
observing police behaviors. While there have been experimental studies on police
reactions to provocative situations,35 there is less about the everyday encounters
that make up much of modern police work in an era of proactive engagement or
stop and frisk. The inherent limitations in accurate accounting of what constitutes
reasonable suspicion suggests some caution in offering generalizations about what
we might call the “cognitions of suspicion.” There is no obvious solution to this
question, since the realities of the situations and police encounters are masked by
the contexts and contingencies in which they take place.
C. Police Actuarialism
The dilution and recasting of suspicion after Terry took place in the same era as
developments in the practice of policing that curtailed officer discretion and
mandated police action regardless of circumstances.36 In emphasizing police
action, aggressiveness was hardly an accident. In these tactics, when suspicion
was present, police were urged if not required to act, under the evolving
institutional limitation of what police can not do. Thus, in contemporary policing,
the dilution of suspicion concurs with the mandate to do and the loss of discretion
about what police can not do.

35

See, for example, Modupe Akinola and Wendy Berry Mendes, Stress-Induced Cortisol
Facilitates Threat-Related Decision Making among Police Officers, 126 Behavioral
Neuroscience 167 (2012) (showing that officers threshold for shooting at suspects vary
according to their biologically-measured stress in the immediate situation).
36
In the Terry stop, Officer McFadden took nearly 20 minutes to observe Terry and
Chilton. In New York stops from 2004-12, observation was limited to one minute in
two-thirds of all stops, and less than two minutes in nearly of 4.43 million stops.
Evidently, officers reach conclusions rather quickly that there is “enough” suspicion to
act. See, Ligon v City of New York, Opinion and Order, supra note _ (data available
from authors). The deliberation of officers envisioned by the Terry court seems to have
given way in modern policing to a set of cognitive heuristics and shortcuts. See,
Kahnemann and Twersky, supra __. It may also reflect a version of the System One and
System Two” processes detailed in Thinking Fast, Thinking Slow. See, Kahnemann,
supra note __.
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The new policing,37 particularly in urban areas, has been shaped by the collision
of policing theories and movements dating back over three decades.38 Broken
Windows (BW) theories focused police attention on disorderly places that were
thought to breed crime.39 Initially, BW theories were designed to identify and
remedy conditions that were conducive to crime, removing the triggers and
signals for criminal activity. But place and people are highly correlated in
policing.40 Under BW theory, the mere presence of people in both social and
physically disorderly locations was a gateway to evaluating the behavior of
people in those places as suspicious, even if the relationship between crime and
disorder was uncertain.41 In effect, place and situation supplanted person as the
first stage inquiry for suspicion. The reputation of a neighborhood was integrated
into the matrix of factors that might trigger suspicion, and perceptions of the place
were conflated with perceptions of the person.42 Put another way, police attention,
though initially focused on broken windows, broadened throughout the 1980s and
37

Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 Fordham Urb. LJ 407 (2000)
One could argue that the development of drug courier profiles in the decade after Terry
was the beginning of the profiling regimes that have led to contentious litigation and
sharp political divisions today. See, David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Redux, 22 St.
Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 73, 77(2003) (discussing the evolution of criminal profiles applied
in everyday street and highway policing from their origins in drug courier profiles
developed by the Drug Enforcement Administration). The drug courier profiling regime
emerged in the 1970s in response to the concurrent drug and violence epidemics
beginning in the late 1960s, and continuing through the early 1990s.
39
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood
Safety, The Atlantic Monthly, March 1982 (suggesting that social and physical disorder
in neighborhoods is strongly linked to crime rates in those places). See, also, Wesley G.
Skogan, Disorder and Decline: Crime and the Spiral of Decay in American
Neighborhoods (1990). But see, Bernard J. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject, supra
note _.
40
Place figured prominently in Terry, for example, where McFadden was alerted to the
presence of Terry and Chilton in a place where their actions suggested they were casing
the store for a possible robbery. Place, in other words, was a multiplier of and a cue for
suspicion. It is odd, though, the court celebrated McFadden’s expertise and 20 years of
experience, yet he had been relegated to pickpocket patrol on a street-level detail.
41
Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush; Systematic Social Observation of
Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 Amer. J.
Sociology 603 (1999) (showing that the effects of disorder on crime is weaker than the
effects of local social cohesion and control). See, also, Bernard Harcourt, Reflecting on
the Subject, supra note _.
42
Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood
Stigma and the Social Construction of “Broken Windows,” 67 Social Psychology
Quarterly 319, 319-20 (2004) (showing that perceptions of disorder are freighted with
meanings that are assigned to places socially rather than what objective measures might
describe).
38
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1990s to focus as much on window breakers as on the physical and social
manifestations of disorder.43 The attention to places broadened the focus of
policing to cast suspicion broadly on people in those places.
The same logic is present in the notion of “hot spots” policing or “problem
oriented” policing, both place-based strategies that directed police toward places
with acute or chronic crime problems.44 Not only were the places targeted for
intensive patrol but the people in them became the focus of patrol tactics. Stops
and temporary seizures were concentrated in these locations; simply being present
in these places heightened suspicion to a level that, whether by policy or simply
discretion, warranted action.45 These tactics were endorsed by a National
Academy of Science Committee in its report on effective (and ineffective)
policing methods.46
A second development in policing formalized the ties between disorder, suspicion
and crime beyond the boundaries of disordered neighborhoods. Order
Maintenance Policing, or OMP, regarded social disorder as signifiers of more
serious crime, and worthy of police attention.47 Police tactics, resources and
attention were directed toward removal of visible signs of social disorder –
“broken windows” – by using police resources both for vigorous enforcement of
laws on minor “quality of life” offenses. Loud music, boisterous street behavior,
petty criminal activity,48 all became occasions for police street detentions if not
arrests. Arrests based on probable cause for minor crimes simplified the task of
more intrusive interactions during these encounters, including searches for

43

Harcourt, supra note _ ; Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken
Windows: Terry, Race and Disorder, 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 4457 (2000)
(analyzing Terry stop data in New York to show that objective measures of physical
disorder are not significant predictors of stop patterns once race is introduced as a
predictor).
44
Wesley G. Skogan and Kathleen Frydl (eds.), Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing:
The Evidence (2004) (describing the nuances that distinguish policing strategies and
tactics that focus on specific places).
45
Geoffrey Alpert et al., Police Suspicion, supra note _; Lawrence W. Sherman And
Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures On Gun Violence: “Hot Spots” Patrol in
Kansas City." 12 Justice Quarterly 673 (1995) (reporting results of a field experiment
where individuals were subject to intensive surveillance and interdiction based on their
presence in areas with high rates of gun violence).
46
Skogan and Frydl, Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing, supra note __.
47
Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life, supra __
48
Jaywalking, alcohol violations, riding bicycles on sidewalks, possession of graffiti
tools, illegal sidewalk vending, etc. See, XXX
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weapons or contraband, or warrant checks for scofflaws or fugitives.49 In effect,
suspicion was bypassed and mooted when police encountered these low levels of
crime. Police aggressiveness in enforcing minor laws was rooted in social
science50, promising returns both in deterrence and crime control.
Stop and frisk is the natural successor to these policing models. Stop and frisk as
envisioned by the Terry was largely a set of distinct “retail” transactions,
characterized by individualization, material or visual indicia, and specificity.51
But the current “wholesale” practice is quite different from the vision of the Terry
court. It incorporates elements of OMP by substituting social disorder for
suspicion of imminent or current criminal activity. It incorporates elements of
“hot spots” by privileging high crime neighborhoods with saturated enforcement
in the search for suspicious activity that may signal crime.52 Individualized

49

See, e.g., Faulkner v US, 636 F.3d 1009 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming practice of using
Terry stops as pretext for searching for individuals with outstanding warrants, even
during an unconstitutional seizure of a person).
50
Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A
Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 163–189 (1988)
(showing that proactive policing had a direct inverse effect on robbery rates in over 170
American cities in 1980 after controlling for other crime-generating conditions such as
poverty, inequality and family disruption). See, also, Sherman and Rogan, supra note __.
51
The details of the Terry stop suggest a lengthy period of observation by Officer
McFadden, and the combination of behavioral indicia that led McFadden to conclude that
Terry, Chilton and Katz were in fact ‘casing’ the store in preparation for a robbery. The
factors that led McFadden to conclude that crime was ‘afoot’ included the time of day,
the commercial location, and the observable behaviors of the three suspects that signaled
preparation for a crime. Race may have factored into the calculus of suspicion: Terry and
Chilton were Black, while the compatriot Katz was white. McFadden, a 20 year veteran
of the Cleveland police, may have reacted to the mixed race company of the three
suspects. In fact, McFadden initiated the seizure when Katz joined the two others to form
a mixed race group, something unusual in the neighborhood that McFadden had
patrolled. “Out of place” stops continue to activiate suspicion today that often leads to
police action. See, Rod Brunson and Ronald Weitzer, supra note _.
52
The “hot spots” regime anticipated very small spaces that were areas of recurring
crime. But these are assessed by proponents as street segments or intersections. See
Weisburd et al, Trajectories of Crime at Places: A Longitudinal Study of Street Segments
in the City of Seattle, 42 Criminology 283-322 (2004) (showing the recurring
disproportionate concentrations of crime in very small areas). Instead, stop and frisk
regimes target large residential and occasionally commercial areas, eschewing the
microscopic perspective on specific locations. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Expert Report,
Floyd v City of New York, October 15, 2010, at See
https://ccrjustice.org/files/Expert_Report_JeffreyFagan.pdf; See, also, Ian Ayres and
Jonathan Borowsky, A Study Of Racially Disparate Outcomes In The Los Angeles Police
Department. ACLU of Southern California (2008), at
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suspicion is thin and diluted, predicated not just on signs of social disorder, but on
metrics that assign suspicion to people collectively in places based on their crime
rates. In effect, individualized suspicion defaulted to appearance-based
regulation.53
Area or neighborhood became the predicate for a thinned out regime of suspicion:
the fact that person A was associated with person B who was known to the police
in neighborhood N that had crime problems, cast suspicion on A regardless of A’s
conduct under the police gaze. A became a target of a stop. Wardlow was the
gateway to this formation of suspicion: although A’s presence in a “high crime
area” fell short of the Terry standard for particularized suspicion of criminal
activity54, a location's characteristics became relevant in deciding whether A’s
behavior or associations was sufficiently suspicious to warrant further
investigation.55 The “specific and articulable facts” that Chief Justice Warren
required in Terry are lost in an actuarial matrix of collective suspicion.56
Suspicion, then, has broadened well beyond the “individualization” prong to
become an exercise in Bayesianism, actuarial profiling, and prospect theory in
action.57
http://www.aclusocal.org/documents/view/47 (showing broad LAPD stop activity spread
widely across minority neighborhoods of Los Angeles).
53
See, e.g., Adam Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearances, 125 Harvard L Rev
1563 (2012); Robert J. Sampson, When Things Aren’t What They Seem: Context and
Cognition in Appearance-Based Regulation, 125 Harvard L Rev Forum 97 (2012).
54
In New York, state law controls the standards for reasonable suspicion. See, People v.
DeBour, 40 N.Y. 2d 210 (1976). In contrast to the two stage inquiry developed in Terry,
DeBour articulates four levels of suspicion: Objective Credible Reason (Approach to
Request Information), Founded Suspicion (Common Law Right of Inquiry), Reasonable
Suspicion (Stop and Frisk), and Probable Cause. See, also, People v. Hollman &
Saunders 79 N.Y, 2d 181(1992)
55
Policing by neighborhood was hardly a new discovery. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528
U.S. 119 (2000). The Wardlow court simply formalized what criminologists had known
for decades, though that decision fails to parameterize exactly what constitutes a high
crime area. See, Ferguson and Bernache, supra note . Early studies on police selection of
citizens for stops suggested that both the racial characteristics of the suspect and the
racial composition of the suspect's neighborhood influence police decisions to stop,
search, or arrest a suspect. See, David S. Kirk, supra note _, for a discussion of early
research on neighborhood contexts of arrest. See, also, Alpert et al., Police Suspicion,
supra note __, showing the interaction of neighborhood characteristics, suspect behavior
and suspect race to animate the formation of suspicion among police officers.
56
See, Amicus Curae Brief of the United States, supra note __. See, also, Meares,
Programming Errors, in this volume.
57
Daniel Kahneman, and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979); Nicholas C. Barberis, Thirty Years of Prospect
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Imagine, then, how individualized suspicion is constructed when police are
mandated to maximize stops, and when there are institutional pressures in place to
do so. The answer is that it is not. Just as stops have become an administrative
regime, so too has suspicion become a de-individuated feature of the encounter. In
New York, approximately 19,000 patrol officers made nearly 5 million street
stops over the decade from 2004-13, rising from fewer than 100,000 in 2003 to
over 685,000 in 2011 before tapering off in late 2012.58 Most were concentrated
in a relatively small number of neighborhoods with high crime rates,
concentrations of non-white residents, and severe socio-economic disadvantage.59
The mandate for ever-increasing stops thus creates a demand for narratives of
suspicion to justify those stops. But throughout this period, serious crime was
declining sharply in New York.60 The prerequisite of individualized suspicion
then, conflicted with the dwindling supply of criminal activity that was available.
The fact that so few stops resulted in legal sanctions suggests the inadequacy of
the bases of suspicion, a fact noted as a constitutional problem in the Floyd
opinion.61 In the face of actuarial suspicion, how then was individualized
suspicion managed? From the experience with stop and frisk in New York, this
essay suggests an answer to this question.
D. Scripting Suspicion
Street stops in New York and most other places are almost always initiated by
police, to be sure. In most stops in New York, police observe a suspect for a
minute or two before proceeding to what state law – People v DeBour62 –
characterizes as a Level I intrusion.63 This requires officers to perform a quick
cognitive processing of complicated and highly contextualized information, and to
exercise care given the potential consequences of wielding that power or failing to
do so. At that point, the stop becomes a social interaction between the suspect and
one or more police officers. The conduct and outcome of these situated
Theory in Economics: A Review and Assessment, 27 J Econ Perspectives 173 (2013).
See, generally, Daniel Kahneman, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011)
58
NYPD Stop and Frisk database, available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_rep
ort.shtml
59
Jeffrey Fagan, Expert Report, Floyd v. City of New York, October 15, 2010
60
Franklin E. Zimring, The City that Became Safe (2011); Jeffrey Fagan, Second
Supplemental Report, Floyd v. City of New York, November 29, 2012
61
Floyd v City of New York, Opinion and Order, supra note __.
62
DeBour, supra note _.
63
Original analysis of the NYPD Stop and Frisk Database, available from authors.
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transactions are shaped by the specific context of the stop. These contexts first
shape the initial perceptions by police, and those perceptions and evaluations of
suspicion then are modified through interactions and exchanges between the
suspect and the officer(s). The setting where the interaction takes place – location,
time of day, presence of bystanders, local social and crime conditions, and
personal “baggage” that each party brings to the event – interacts with the details
of the event to shape the verbal and perhaps physical exchanges that take place,
the decisions within the event and its outcome, and how the event is perceived
and reconstructed once it concludes.
The question for this essay is whether individualized suspicion gives way to the
convenience of these cognitive or perceptual scripts – stylized narratives of
suspicion – when police discretion narrows to mandate what police can not do, or
in other words, what they are obligated within their command structure, to do.
Scripts are handy conveniences to manage complex cognitive tasks, especially
when those tasks become burdensome in the face of both administrative demands
and the need to articulate a basis for action.
What then, is a script? Script theory offers a way of generalizing, organizing, and
systematizing knowledge about the processual aspects and requirements of
recurring events. The theory borrows heavily from cognitive psychology and was
first articulated by Professor Robert Abelson in 1976.64 According to Abelson, a
“script” is a cognitive structure or framework that organizes a person’s
understanding of typical situations, allowing the person to have expectations and
to make conclusions about the potential result of a set of events. 65 Script theory
has been widely used in social psychology to identify patterns of decision making
and social interactions that persist among persons within social networks.66
64

Robert P. Abelson, Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision-making, in
Cognition and Social Behavior 33 (J.S. Carroll & J. W. Payne eds., 1976).
65
Id. See, also, Robert P. Abelson, “Psychological Status of the Script Concept,” 36
American Psychologist 715 (1981).
66
Id. Script theory can explain contagion in several ways: (1) scripts are ways of
organizing knowledge and behavioral choices; (2) individuals learn behavioral repertoires
for different situations; (3) these repertoires are stored in memory as scripts and are
elicited when cues are sensed in the environment; (4) choice of scripts varies between
individuals and some individuals will have limited choices; (5) individuals are more
likely to repeat scripted behaviors when the previous experience was considered
successful; (6) scripted behavior may become “automatic” without much thought or
weighing of consequences; and (7) scripts are acquired through social interactions among
social networks members. Within structurally equivalent networks, such as professions or
unions, similarly situated people are likely to influence or adopt behaviors from one
another that can make that person and her ideas more attractive as a source of further
relations.
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Abelson locates scripts as an almost essential tool in executing a number of
psychological tasks.67 Derek Cornish regards scripts both as organizing tools for
connecting events, but also as procedural tools for decisions about how to proceed
within events.68
After a time, these ideas and scripts become socially contagious, spreading from
person to person and group to group.69 In this case, we might hypothesize that
there are memes of suspicion that are articulated through repetition and practice,
valued for their utility within social networks, and then adopted and applied in a
probabilistic way to a set of recognizable circumstances and situations.70
This approach does not deny the importance of the individual attributes that bring
people to situations, such as “disputatiousness,” but recognizes that once an
encounter begins, other processes shape their outcomes.71 Events can be analyzed
as “situated transactions,” including rules that develop within specific sociocultural contexts including both police and street cultures, the situations and
contexts where stops take place, and the personality "sets" of the actors. For
67

He explains: “The script concept raises and sketchily addresses a number of
fundamental psychological issues: within cognitive psychology, the nature of knowledge
structures for representing ordinary experience; within social psychology, the way in
which social reality is constructed and how constructions of reality translate into social
behavior through action rules; in learning and developmental psychology, how and what
knowledge structures are learned in the course of ordinary experience; in clinical
psychology, how resonances between present situations and past schemata can preempt
behavior maladaptively.” Id at 727
68
In applying script concepts to crimes, Cornish says that "[t]he unfolding of a crime
involves a variety of sequential dependencies within and between elements of the action:
crimes are pushed along or impeded by situational contingencies--situated motives;
opportunities in terms of settings; victims and targets; the presence of co-offenders;
facilitators, such as guns and cars." Cornish's "script" focuses in detail on the step-bystep procedures of committing crime that are learned, stored in memory, and enacted
when situational cues are present. See, Derek Cornish, The Procedural Analysis of
Offending, in 3 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 151-196 (R.V. Clarke ed., 1994).
69
Wilkinson and Fagan, Firearm Scripts, supra note __. See, also, Jeffrey Fagan et al.,
Social Contagion of Violence, in The Cambridge Handbook of Violent Behavior (Daniel
Flannery, et. al., eds.) 688 (2007).
70
Peter Marsden, Memetics and Social Contagion: Two Sides of the Same Coin? 2
Journal of Memetics - Evolutionary Models of Information Transmission (1998), at
http://cfpm.org/jom-emit/1998/vol2/marsden_p.html
71
Richard B. Felson & Henry J. Steadman, Situational Factors in Disputes Leading to
Criminal Violence, 21 Criminology 59-60 (1983); Richard B. Felson, Impression
Management and the Escalation of Aggression and Violence, 45 Soc. Psychol. Q. 245
(1982); David F. Luckenbill & Daniel P. Doyle, Structural Position and Violence:
Developing a Cultural Explanation, 27 Criminology 422-23 (1989); William Oliver, The
Violent Social World of Black Men 138-40 (1994).
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example, there may be grounded “rules” that govern how stops unfold, and how
officers employ their authority as a form of performance both for suspects and
their peers.72
E. Categorical Cognition and Suspicion
Police ethnographers in the era bookending the Terry opinion – Jerome Skolnick,
John van Maanen, Carl Klockars – constructed categories that collapsed
suspicious persons, suspicious appearances and suspicious behavior. Hard as it
may be to unpack the cognitive steps in finalizing that sorting, the three
dimensions seem to collapse into one another. In one instance, the behavior or
appearance may lead to the categorization of the person, and in another instance,
the person’s appearance together with other markers such as place or time of day
may prime the degree of suspicion signaled by their behavior. In either case, the
cognitive mechanics of sorting and classification are likely to be at work in the
determination not just of suspicion, but also of risk and danger as predicates of
police action.
Categorization is a natural and identifiable process. Categories are essential to
navigate through a world of uncertainty in social interactions.73 The embedding
of those interactions in locations and institutional frameworks adds layers to the
categorization process. Categorization is a well understood process, with
confirming research originating with Gordon Allport in 1954 and continuing for
the ensuing six decades.74 The moving parts of the process involve human
information processing, and heuristics to classify individuals based on that
information (with updates). Prior experience and knowledge are important in
creating a set of categories that seem to “work,” in that they efficiently sort
persons or events.
As the early police ethnographers suggest, the number of categories is limited
(due perhaps to capacity), so that police (in our case) are forced to group
72

On Alvin’s recording of a street stop, the voice of the accompanying sergeant can be
heard raising doubts about Alvin’s claims of innocence and subtly challenging the patrol
officer to take a skeptical, hostile and more aggressive stance, including threats of
violence. A close hearing of the tape reveals the role of the sergeant as an animator and
escalator of conflict between the officer and Alvin. See, “Mutt” tape, supra note __.
73
Roland Fryer and Matthew O. Jackson, A Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased
Decision Making, 8 The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Issue 1, Article 6, at
http://bepress/bejte/vol8/iss1/art6
74
Fryer and Jackson, id. See, also, Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice, 1954.
Gordon W Allport, The Historical Background of Modern Social Psychology, 1
Handbook of Social Psychology 3-56 (1954).
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heterogeneous experiences into the same categories. The less frequent the events
or persons, the more heterogeneous the bins.75 The groupings shape how new
units that come along (persons, events) are sorted and classified. Rare events or
persons are more coarsely grouped due to lack of information on intragroup
differences. When the prior groupings can no longer resolve the indicia that a
person or event presents, new groupings may be created in a process (one hopes)
of Bayesian updating.76
The early police ethnographies suggested simple schemes, perhaps even binaries.
The van Mannen typology of three seemed optimal for police to accomplish their
work. Van Maanen also suggests what the appropriate responses are to each
group. For instance, the “assholes” were worthy of street justice – meaning
physical assault – simply to reinforce the power hierarchy of the police in the
areas of their routine activity, regardless of whether they had broken any laws.77
Skolnick also suggested a binary scheme, building both on his own conclusions
about archetypes who were suspicious and the work of other police professionals
who used their own criteria for sorting. Perhaps such binaries are optimal in
modern police work since the action that follows the categorization is a seizure or
street stop. The sorting and categorization task is of interest, then, in
understanding how suspicion is constructed, and how much suspicion must be
present to animate police action.
Experience matters to help in the weighting of the factors. But so too does the
institutional dimension that impels action. Again, categorization is one thing,
deciding on the threshold for placing a suspect into a suspicion bin that warrants
action is quite another. But in an institutional design that urges – or mandates –
action, the threshold is likely to be forced downward. Cognitive processing of the
appearances of suspicion may produce a large pool of potential suspects for stops,
but which are selected may have more to do with an external threshold than with
the natural or deregulated decision of the individual officer.
F. When Police Can Not Do

75

The number of categories or bins that are optimal remains unknown. Fryer and
Matthew, supra __, suggest a mathematical proof to identity an efficient set of bins, but
there are no empirical tests to date.
76
For an example on criminal behavior, see: Shamena Anwar and Thomas A. Loughran,
Testing A Bayesian Learning Theory of Deterrence Among Serious Juvenile Offenders,
49 Criminology 667-98 (2011).
77
Van Maanen, The Asshole, supra note _. See, also, John Van Maanen, Observations
on the Making of Policemen, 32 Human Organization 407-18 (1973).
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To understand what police do, it’s important to also understand what they can not
do. So, the exigencies of the institutional regime interacts with the situational
dynamics of everyday stop activity, and with ex ante assumptions about suspects
(including bias) and behavioral indicia. The institutional framing of proactive
stops imparts particular meaning to the search for suspicious persons as part of a
larger and more urgent public safety project. When we consider the
neighborhood setting of a police-citizen encounter, the behavioral styles of
suspects in those places, and the rank of one interaction in a long string of similar
interactions for both police and suspects, the result can easily become a complex
set of interactions fraught with tension and risk. In a regime that values volume,
the need to simplify a complex and charged cognitive landscape through scripts
can shape what is said and what happens in the course of contact. And of course,
institutional prerogatives for higher stop activity threaten to compromise both the
level at which the individual officer locates the threshold as well as increasing the
elasticity of both the separate components of suspicion and their totality
The recording task itself also can create a demand for routinization and scripting.
It takes a fair amount of cognitive work, not to mention the actual labor of writing
or recording, to articulate the bases of a Terry stop. The physical task itself is
difficult: often, writing on a small portion of a small piece of paper (an
instrument) designed to gather several domains of information about the
interaction between the citizen and the police. Recall becomes a burden, and the
burden multiplies across strings of stops. And these are complex social
interactions, where even if the balance of power resides with the police officer,
there is an active process between both parties to manage the interaction toward a
desired outcome. In other words, it’s not just physical shoehorning of information
on a small administrative form, but also conceptual shoehorning of complex
interaction into narrow categories whose fit with the reality of the encounters is
poor.
Also, in the course of this transaction, the meanings of suspicion at the outset will
change over time as more information is revealed or withheld. And the endpoint
of the interaction will reflect this negotiated situational transaction. This
increases the burden on the police officer to capture and articulate – in an
individualized and recognizable terms that can satisfy a legal review – the details
of suspicion.
The empirical challenge in detailing this model is to identify the preferences of
police in a regime of severely constrained situations where actions lie somewhere
between “ritual and strategy.”78 The construction of suspicion in modern actuarial
78

See, generally, Jeffrey Alexander, Cultural Pragmatics: Social Performance between
Ritual and Strategy, 22 Sociological Theory 527 (2004).
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policing, whether reasonable or not, seems to reflect the convergence of revealed
and normative preferences. Normative preferences represent the agent's actual
interests, whereas revealed preferences are tastes that rationalize a principal
agent's observed actions. But there are many cases where this assumption is
violated. In this case, we can assume that revealed preferences are identical to
normative preferences, since the margin for discretion has severely narrowed.
The next section goes about the task of empirically detailing what those
preferences are, as observed in the articulation of reasonable and individualized
suspicion under New York’s stop and frisk regime of the past two decades.

II. Empirics of Scripted Suspicion
The New York City stop and frisk data79 provides an opportunity to assess
recurring patterns and narratives of suspicion, and to discern whether these
patterns show sufficient consistency to take on the characteristics of a script.
Data from 4.7 million stops from 2004-12 reveal what officers see in the run-up to
street stops. First, we can exploit these data on police officers’ accounts of the
reasons and bases for effecting a Terry stop. Second, using the same data, we can
assess the extent to which, within the limits of reporting, police officers adhere to
Terry’s individualization requirement or develop recurring and stylized narratives
of suspicion.
A. The Empirical Project
Following the 1999 investigation of the NYPD stop and frisk practices by the
New York State Attorney General,80 the City entered into a Stipulated Settlement
in Daniels v. City of New York81 in 2003. The Daniels Plaintiffs had claimed
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The settlement mandated
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The NYPD publishes downloadable case records annually for all stops from 20032013. Records include information on the demographic characteristics of the suspect, the
suspected crime, stop location (precinct), the command assignment of the officer,
seizures of weapons or contraband, use of force during the stop, the stop outcome (frisk
search, arrest, summons), and the bases for suspicion animating the stop. Data are
available at:
http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/analysis_and_planning/stop_question_and_frisk_rep
ort.shtml . For this analysis, we use data from 2004-12. The first year in the series was
dropped due to the late startup of the current recording procedure during the calendar
year, and the high incidence of missing or erroneous data during that year.
80
Spitzer Report, supra note __, at __
81
Stipulated Settlement, Daniels v City of New York, December 31, 2003
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procedures for NYPD officers to record the rationales for street stops under the
“stop and frisk” program.
Beginning in 2003, a set of check boxes replaced the narrative format for
recording Fourth Amendment stop justifications that was used at the time of the
1999 study.82 The boxes included nine affirmative stop rationales plus an option
to check “other” and record the specifics by hand. The nine rationales were
identified jointly by plaintiffs in the Daniels case and the City, incorporating a set
of categories based on both state and federal caselaw that would sustain a Fourth
Amendment test for the individualized stop rationales.83 The check boxes were
rooted in both federal and state caselaw. The new procedure also included a box
for “other” factors, which officers also recorded narratively. On the back side of
the form, officers were trained to record a series of “additional circumstances” to
justify the stop. Officers could check off as many boxes as needed to express the
basis for the stop.
The form included nine “stop factors” plus as an option to check “other” and
record the details. It also included nine “additional circumstances” plus an option
to check “other” and record the information narratively. Table 1 lists the 20 stop
factors and additional circumstances. About 95% of the stops from 2004-12
checked between one and six factors, creating 60,459 possible combinations that
express the bases of suspicion. Because of redundancy in the meanings and
descriptions of these factors, we reduced the 20 to a set of nine distinct and nonoverlapping factors. The first column in Table 2 shows reduced factors, and the
second column shows the components based on the original set of 20.
Table 1 Here
Table 2 Here
We used two analyses to illustrate the narrowing and patterning of suspicion as
articulated by officers through this system. The first simply examines over time
the use of each of the nine composite factors. We show this through a set of
graphs that charts the use of each factor for each calendar quarter from 2004-12.
Table 3 shows the characteristics of the persons stopped in this period.
The second analysis examines a set of regression models that attempt to explain
stop patterns over time within New York’s 76 police precincts.84 We first
82

The check boxes were incorporated into the standard reporting form for stops, the UF250. A copy of the revised UF-250 form with the check boxes is in Appendix A.
83
Daniels Stipulated Settlement, at __
84
The Central Park precinct is omitted, due to low population, low crime and low stop
activity.
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estimate the regressions without including the stop factors. We estimate models
for all stops, and then disaggregate stops by the suspected crime that animated the
stop. We then add the suspicion factors to determine the extent to which
individualized suspicion improves the model fit and its explanatory power.
Individualized and reasonable suspicion should clarify the patterns of stops, and
reveal the actual preferences of officers in forming suspicion to make stops.
These bases of suspicion are disaggregated by the suspected crime in the stop.
For example, models that estimate the patterns of stops alleging drug offenses
should improve with the inclusion of the “drug transaction” stop factor. We test
this assumption across a range of suspected crimes.
B. Dilution, Expansion, and Dependence
Over time, officers identify progressively more circumstances to justify
their stops. Figure 1 shows that the average number of factors has grown by about
30% over 9 years, from 3.0 factors per stop to 3.8 factors per stop. The number of
stops where officers check off five or more factors also rose, from 16.5% in 2004
to 28.1% of all stops in 2012, an increase of 83%. This could reflect better
training and sensitivity to the specific circumstances surrounding each stop, but as
the graphs in Figure 2 suggest, it more likely reflects a decreasing sensitivity or
attention to matching the realities of stops to the categories available to check
them off. As stops have grown in number over time, officers appear to be casting
a wider net of justifications to satisfy the suspicion requirements for the stop.
Figure 1 Here
At the same time that the accounts of “suspicion” were diversifying, officers
increasingly relied on a narrow set of specific factors to articulate individualized
suspicion. Figure 2 shows a set of simple graphs charting changes in the use of
each of the stop factors over time. We look in these graphs for patterning and
narrowing, to examine whether the specificity of the reasons for stops has been
diluted over time, in contrast to the individualization requirements of both state
and federal caselaw.85
Figure 2 Here
85

Terry v Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See, also, People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (1976)
(articulating the standard for search and seizure under New York common law). See,
also, Brief of the United States as Amicus Curae, supra note __, for the narrow set of
indicia that the U.S. put before the Terry court. See, Tracey Meares, Programming
Errors, in this volume. Meares points out that there is almost no overlap between the
factors put before the Terry court (and presumably incorporated into its conceptualization
of “reasonable” and “individualized” suspicion, and the factors on the NYPD form
shown in Appendix A.
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Several distinct patterns are evident. First, three factors are used consistently and
infrequently over time. “Drug Transactions” are marked in about 10% of all stops,
as is “Criminal Appearances” and “Suspicious Object.” The latter rises over time
from 10% to 15% of stops, but the increase is slight in degree. “Criminal
Appearances” in marked in just under 10% of stops, with little variation over time.
“Violent Crime” rises over time from about 5% of all stops to10%, but remains
low.86 There seems to be some care by officers in the use of these three factors,
suggesting a measure of individualization under particular circumstances.
Others are used consistently over time or with little variation, but at a higher rate.
“Fits Description” is marked in about 25% of stops, but varies within a narrow
range and declines slightly over time. “Casing” exhibits a similar pattern: it is
checked in about 35% of stops. (Casing was the suspected crime that animated the
stop of John Terry). Use of this factor rises from about one stop in five in 2004 to
nearly 30% by the end of 2011. While falling within the broad conceptual space
of “reasonableness,” these two factors seem to say less about individualization of
suspicion than serving as handy bins of suspicion that judges can easily
understand to satisfy constitutional review.
The use of either of the two “Other” factors declines over time, from nearly 30%
of all stops to just below 20%. The decline in use of the opportunity to tailor and
articulate the suspicion rationale suggests increasing comfort with the broad bins
offered by the other categories, and perhaps a shift among officers toward deindividuation when offered a suspicion recipe or menu. It could also simply be an
efficiency choice: checking “other” requires an additional recording burden to
state the specific circumstances that fell outside the easier choices. And if officers
invoke additional factors that boost the amount of suspicion – such as “High
Crime Area”87 – the need to record details of suspicion is mooted. Absent an
86

“Actions Indicative of Engaging in Violent Crimes” is generally a factor that, standing
alone, can serve as the basis of a lawful stop. See People v. Howard, 542 N.Y.S.2d 536,
538 (1st Dep’t 1989).
87
See, Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000) (finding that flight from the police in a
“high crime area” could constitute reasonable suspicion for a stop). But the Wardlow
court offered no test the basis of a Wardlow claim. In U.S. v. Montero-Camargo, 208
F.3d 1122, 1125 (2000), the majority concluded that a suspect’s presence in a high crime
area is not enough to support reasonable and particularized suspicion, and that the factor
“not be used with respect to the entire neighborhood … in which members of minority
groups go about their daily business”). See, also, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien
Bernache, “The ‘High-Crime Area’ Question: Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable
Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis,” 57 Am. U. L. Rev.
1587, 1588 (2008) (demonstrating current Supreme Court jurisprudence provides those
stopped in “high-crime area” with less robust Fourth Amendment protections).
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institutional demand for strong articulation of the bases of suspicion, why would
an officer maximize detail when satisficing on the recording burden would
provide “enough” suspicion.88 None of these interpretations suggests stronger
compliance with Terry’s (and DeBour”s) individuation demands, and instead
suggests an increasing comfort among officers with other shortcuts to establishing
reasonable suspicion.
Two factors in particular suggest the presence of a script, and its development
over time. First, officers increasingly relied on the “Evasive and Furtive”
movement factor over time. One or more of its components was checked off in
about 40% of all stops in 2004, rising to over 60% in 2011. The term “furtive
movements” can be used to refer to an almost infinite number of actions that an
officer might find suspicious. This factor is vague in its meaning and subjective in
its interpretation. In some instances, a furtive movement might be a strong signal
that a suspect is carrying a weapon. 89 But in others, as in Alvin’s stop, a “furtive
movement” may be nothing more than a glance at an officer, or, fearing an
encounter with an officer, someone hurrying down the street to avoid police
contact. There is considerable space between those poles for an officer to use this
particular factor to motivate and justify a stop. The general failure of officers to
find guns in the millions of stops during this time is another sign of the
expansiveness of the interpretation of this factor. Its increasing use suggests its
core role in a script of suspicion.
Second, nearly three stops in four used one or more indicators of crime location
consistently over time. HCA is vulnerable to subjective and highly contextualized
interpretation, and alone, is legally insufficient to justify a stop but may be when

88

March 2013 NYPD Operations Order requiring officer to provide narrative detail of the
specific indicia of suspicion in each stop. Available from author.
89
Absent movements indicating that suspect might be armed, furtive movements cannot
give rise to reasonable suspicion. See People v. Powell, N.Y.S.2d 725, 727-28 (1st Dep’t
1998) (holding that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to frisk a suspect walking
with his arm stiffly against his body in a high crime area); United States v. McCrae, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2314, *9-*10 (E.D.N.Y. January 11, 2008); United States v. McCrae,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2314, *9-*10 (E.D.N.Y. January 11, 2008) (holding that an
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect who moved his hand from the
center of his stomach to the left side of his waist in a manner that the officer claimed was
similar to how an officer handles firearms while in plain clothes); United States v.
Doughty, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74248, *18 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2008) (holding that an
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop a suspect who adjusted his waistband in
a manner consistent with carrying a firearm);See, also, People v. Woods, 64 N.Y.2d 736,
737 (N.Y. 1984)
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used in conjunction with other factors.90 But under Wardlow, the high crime area
rationale was sufficient to multiply the constitutionality of other factors which,
standing alone, were not sufficient to justify a seizure. Figure 2 shows the use of
just the “High Crime Area” was used in more than 55% of all stops during this
period. Together with other indicia of crime location, 75% of all stops were based
in part on the High Crime Area factor. It is more than a sign of a script, it seems
to be a pretext used by officers to reach a minimal level of individual and
reasonable suspicion.91 Used this way, it has little power to distinguish the
circumstances of one stop from another.
One final sign of the scripting of suspicion is evident in the consistent use of
Crime Location and Evasive/Furtive factors across the city, regardless of the
actual crime rate in the location where it is used. To construct Figure 3, we
analyzed the specific locations of each stop, and examined the actual crime rate in
those areas. The entire city was divided into quintiles, or 20% bracket. The
lowest quintile in Figure 3 includes the safest 20% of all precincts in the City, and
the highest quintile includes the 20% with the highest total crime rates.
Figure 3 Here
Again, as in the other indicia of individual suspicion, there is a gradual and
persistent process of desensitization of these factors to conform to the realities in
which NYPD officers patrol. To the trend toward increasing use of the
“evasive/furtive” factor may simply reflect the adoption and spread of a cognitive
framework to filter perceptions of the criminogenic and disorderly characteristics
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See, Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000). See, also, Andrew Guthrie Ferguson &
Damien Bernache, “The ‘High-Crime Area’ Question: Requiring Verifiable and
Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis,” 57 Am.
U. L. Rev. 1587, 1588 (2008) (demonstrating current Supreme Court jurisprudence
provides those stopped in “high-crime area” with less robust Fourth Amendment
protections).
91
See, U.S. v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122 (2000). Judge Kozkinsi writes in
dissent: “Without hesitation, the majority treats this as a crime wave, but is it really?
Does an arrest every four months or so make for a high crime area? Compare United
States v. Thornton, 197 F.3d 241, 248 (7th Cir.1999) ("In less than one year there had
been some 2,500 drug arrests in the five-block-by-five-block area where the incident
occurred.")…. Can we rely on the vague and undocumented recollections of the officers
here? …Are such estimates sufficiently precise to tell us anything useful about the area?
… [T]o rely on every cop's repertoire of war stories to determine what is a ‘high crime
area’ - and on that basis to treat otherwise innocuous behavior as grounds for reasonable
suspicion - strikes me as an invitation to trouble. I would be most reluctant to give police
the power to turn any area into a high crime area based on their unadorned personal
experiences.”
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of their patrol sectors.92 In turn, officers may reflexively attribute the conditions
of local crime and social disorder to all suspects in that area. Again, one can see a
widely shared script emerging and taking hold in the perceptual frames of
patrolling officers.
D. Normative and Revealed Preferences
Next, we estimated the extent incorporating the suspicion factors weaken or
improve regression estimates to explain stop patterns.93 If individualized
suspicion is functioning well as a set of standards guiding officer discretion when
making stops, the inclusion of these standards in a regression analysis predicting
stop patterns should result in a substantial overall improvement in the explanation
of patterns of stops. That is, if the stop factors as applied reflect a consistent and
accurate pattern of the incorporating Fourth Amendment standards, model fit –
the capacity of a statistical model to capture the variance of a phenomenon across
sampling units – should improve. Here, we report the pseudo R2, a measure that
shows model fit for regressions of events such as police stops.94 Also, by
identifying factors that predict crime-specific patterns that explain stops, we can
begin to distinguish between normative and revealed preferences.
Table 4 summarizes four features of these analyses for each crime-specific model.
First, it shows the explained variance, or goodness of fit, for each model without
consideration of the stop or suspicion factors. The next five columns show results
when the NYPD suspicion factors are incorporated into the model. The third
column shows which of the stop factors or additional circumstances were
92

See, Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush, “Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood
Stigma and the Social Construction of ‘Broken Windows’”67 Social Psychology
Quarterly 319-342(2004)
93
Regression models were estimated in two stages. First, a series of negative binomial
regressions were estimated for stops within each of six types of suspected crime. Each
model included (1) precinct racial composition, (2) total precinct residential population,
(3) precinct socio-economic status, (4) local crime conditions, the percentage crime
complaints that corresponds to the suspected crime for the model, (5) patrol strength, and
(6) a dummy variable indicating that the precinct was (or was not) one of the four
business precincts. Then, for each model in Table 4, the same model was estimated
again, this time including a variable for the percent of all stops in the precinct where each
suspicion factor was checked. In this second set of regressions, a variable for the average
number of factors for each stop was included.
94
The goodness of fit of a statistical model describes how well it fits a set of
observations. Measures of goodness of fit typically summarize the discrepancy between
observed values and the values expected under the model in question. Such measures can
be used in statistical hypothesis testing. See, e.g., David W. Hosmer and Stanley
Lemeshow, Goodness of Fit Statistics for the Logistic Regression Model, 9
Communications in Statistics 1043 (1980).

26

statistically significant positive predictors of the number of stops. The fourth
column shows the statistically significant negative predictors: those factors that
were significantly less likely to appear in a pattern of crime-specific stops.
Insert Table 4
The fifth column shows the R2 for each crime-specific model when the stop
factors are included. The sixth column shows the marginal R2 – the change in R2
– that estimates the improvement over the model without stop factors. If
reasonable suspicion is in fact animating these stops, the regressions should show
a convergence between the normative and revealed preferences in police stop
decisions. Overall model fit should improve over chance at the margins when
more accurate explanatory information is included. In other words, more
information should lead to less chance, and a more systematic understanding of
how often, where and under what circumstances stops take place. In other words,
revealed preferences should tell us more about stop patterns than when that
information is masked.
Two trends stand out in Table 4. First, in most cases the models, even with the
addition of the RS factors, explain only around half the variance. The model for
all stops explains 74% of the variance, a strong estimate. But this estimate is
perhaps misleading, since it is driven by the Crime Location measure, which is
present in nearly 60% of all stops. In other words, the model is tautological with
the “high crime area” script that is pervasive in the formation of suspicion in this
regime.
Second, in most cases, model fit improves very little with the addition of the
suspicion factors. Improvement was 10 percentage points or fewer for five of the
seven models. The rationales are as likely to be unobserved as observed using
Terry and subsequent Fourth Amendment criteria. The two models where the
suspicion factors improved model fit by more than .10 were those predicting drug
stops and trespass stops. In these two models, estimated model fit nearly doubles:
the pseudo-R2 for drug stops increases from .29 to .52, and the pseudo-R2 for
trespass stops increases from .30 to .57. Drug stops are tautological, as evidenced
by the specific factors in those stops where suspicion often is isomorphic with the
suspected crime itself. The same is true for trespass stops, which are concentrated
in public housing sites.95 Conceptually, without a stop and an inquiry, it is
difficult to imagine ex ante factors that would lead to suspicion of trespass.96
95

Jeffrey Fagan and Garth Davies, Race and Selective Enforcement in Public Housing, 9
J. Empirical Legal Studies 697 (2012) (showing the heavy spatial concentration of
trespass stops in New York City public housing sites from 2004-11)
96
Adam Carlis, The Illegality of Vertical Patrol, 102 Columbia Law Review 2002 (2009)
(showing the failure of trespass enforcement practices under the NYPD stop and frisk
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NYPD officers routinely claim “High Crime Area” as the stop rationale in trespass
stops, based on the categorization in policy of public housing as a problematically
crime-ridden venue.97
The positive predictors of stop activity suggest few crime-specific references.
Stops for nearly all crime types are predicted by “crime location” (the exceptions
being weapons and QOL stops), suggesting that officers may be invoking a
convenient script that is rarely challenged. The “crime location” script, like the
“suspicious object” rationale in weapons stops, does away with the more
demanding task of articulating individuated actions, and under current caselaw, is
not easily challenged.98
III. Conclusion
As stops increased in New York from fewer than 100,000 in 1998 to over 685,000
in 2011,99 individuated suspicion became elusive, and officers defaulted to
convenient and stylized narratives to justify stops. In turn, we suspect that police
constructed scripts of suspicion that could be tailored and invoked to fit the
cosmetic or epidemiological circumstances of a stop. The weak evidence of
specificity in stop patterns, coupled with the reliance of a small number of factors
to justify individualized suspicion, hints at the drift toward memes and scripts to
satisfy a weakly enforced and regulated Fourth Amendment regime. When
repeated across hundreds of interactions, and when knowledge of these
interactions is shared within dense information networks of officers, narratives are
shaped and reinforced in a process that combines both self-presentation,100 that
allows officers to give accounts of their actions,101 and that conforms to the
requirements of training and law.
When there is a burden on officers to develop sustainable narratives, these
network supports become important places to practice and refine plausible
regime to comport with Fourth Amendment standards of reasonable and articulable
suspicion).
97
See generally Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Second
Amended Complaint, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, June 8, 2011,
http://www.naacpldf.org/document/davis-amendedcomplaint . See, also, Carlis, id.
98
See, e.g., Montero-Camargo, supra note _.
99
Spitzer Report, id. Fagan Expert Report, supra note _.
100
Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, 17-25 (1959). See, also
Marsden, Memetics and Social Contagion, supra note _.
101
Marvin B. Scott, and Stanford M. Lyman, Accounts, 33 American Sociological
Review 46-62 (1968).
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narratives of suspicion. The narratives, in turn, become scripts that are widely
shared. They are handy, in fact, to simplify complexity. The scripts are "rules"
that shape, both cognitively and perceptually, how situations are perceived, how
to choose among contingent actions to proceed (or not) with a stop, what language
and tone is used, and how to respond to any of several reactions from the suspect.
To some extent, such formalities or patterned responses to a heavy workload and
set of administrative demands are unavoidable. But when built into everyday
practice, the use of scripts, or memes, or stylized narratives poses real challenges
for Fourth Amendment regulation.
Regulation fails in this regard since the scripts seem to sustain a regime that is
remarkably inefficient at detecting wrongdoing while simultaneously failing to
satisfy even today’s weak Fourth Amendment standards.102 It’s more than
reasonable to ask how useful it is to memorialize these categories and scripts
when the rates of arrest, prosecution and conviction are so low. The police must
surely know that their accounts will go unchallenged, since most are never
challenged in an adversarial setting. The centrality of these scripts with what the
federal court found to be a constitutionally deficient regime suggests that Terry’s
balancing act has gone awry.

102

Floyd v. City of New York, Opinion and Order, supra __ (noting that police fail to
make arrest or seize guns or other contraband in about nine stops in 10). Among those
subject to court review, nearly half of those fail to reach a conviction, suggesting an error
rate of nearly 95%. See, Eric T. Schneidermann, A Report on Arrests Arising from the
New York City Police Department’s Stop-and-Frisk Practices (November 2013), at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_NOV_2013.pdf
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Figure 1. Factors per Stop, 2004-12
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Figure 2. Percent of Stops Using Each Suspicion Factor by Calendar Quarter, 2004-12

Figure 3. Percent High Crime Area Stops and Furtive
Movement Stops by Precinct Crime Quintile
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Table 1. Specific Stop Circumstances and Percent of
Stops Based on Each Factor (N=4,783,793)
Factor
Report of Witness or Victim
Fits Description
Furtive Movements
Evasive Response
Changed Direction
Ongoing Investigation
Area has High Crime Incidence
Time of Day
Proximity to Scene
Casing
Acting as Lookout
Other (CS)
Other (AC)
Drug Transaction
Suspicious Bulge
Clothing Used in Crime
Associating with Known Criminals
Sights and Sounds of Criminal Activity
Suspicious object
Actions Indicate Violent Crime

% of Stops
12.4
17.0
45.0
17.0
24.0
13.0
56.0
37.0
20.0
29.0
17.0
20.0
4.0
9.0
9.0
4.0
4.0
2.0
3.0
8.0

Source: NYPD Stop and Frisk Database, various years.
Percent exceeds 100% because the majority of stops have
multiple factors indicated. Stops excluded if suspect age is below
10 or above 85 years.

Table 2. Use of Suspicion Factors with Components, NYPD Street Stops, 2004-12
Factor
N

% of Stops
4,433,793

Components

Fits Description

21.6

“Fits description"

Evasive/Furtive

54.9

“Furtive movements”
“Evasive, furtive or inconsistent response to officer's questions”
“Changing direction at sight of officer/flight”)

Crime Location

73.2

“Area has high incidence of reported offense of type under investigation”
“Time of day, day of week, season corresponding to reports of criminal
activity”
“Ongoing investigations, e.g. robbery pattern”
“Proximity to crime location”

Casing

35.8

“Actions indicative of 'casing' a victim or location”
“Actions indicative of acting as a lookout”

Other

22.2

“Other reasonable suspicion of criminal activity”
“Other additional circumstance”

Drug Transaction

9.2

“Actions indicative of engaging in a drug transaction”

Suspicious Object

12.7

“Suspicious bulge/object”
“Wearing clothes/disguises commonly used in the commission of a crime”
“Carrying objects in plain view used in the commission of a crime"

Criminal Appearances

8.3

“Suspect is associating with persons known for their criminal activity"
“Sights and sounds of criminal activity, e.g. bloodstains, ringing alarms”

Violent Crime
8.0
“Actions indicative of engaging in violent crime”
Substantive Factors are said to appear in a stop if at least one included circumstance is indicated by the NYPD. Percents
exceed 100% due to multiple factors indicated per stop. Stops excluded if suspect age is below 10 or above 85 years.

Table 3. Characteristics of Suspects in NYPD Street
Stops, Jan. 2004 - Jun. 2013
N
4,783,793
Race (%)
White
Black
Hispanic
Other or Unknown

9.8
51.9
30.6
7.6

Age
Mean
Std. Dev.

28.1
(11.5)

Sex (%)
Male
Female
Unknown

90.2
7.0
2.8

Suspected Offense (%)*
Murder
Drug
Violence
Weapons
Property
Trespass
Quality of Life
Other

.1
8.3
15.6
18.4
19.1
9.2
1.3
28.1

* Total > 100% due to rounding error
Source: New York City Police Department, various years. Stops
with suspects below age 10 and above age 85 omitted.

Table 4. Factors Predicting Stop Rates by Suspected Crime and Change in Model Fit, All Stops 2004-2012
Suspected Crime Model Fit (no Positive Predictors
Negative Predictors
Model Fit (with Overall Model
RS factors)
RS Factors)
Improvement
Total Stops
.64
Crime Location
Fits Description
.74
.10
Evasive/Furtive
Other
Criminal Appearances
Violence Stops
.51
Crime Location
Fits Description
.57
.06
Casing
Evasive/Furtive
Criminal Appearances
Other
Drug Transaction
Suspicious Object
Property Stops
.35
Crime Location
Fits Description
.40
.05
Casing
Evasive/Furtive
Drug Transaction
Suspicious Object
Drug Stops
.29
Crime Location
Fits Description
.52
.23
Drug Transaction
Evasive/Furtive
Casing
Other
Criminal Appearances
Violent Crime
Weapons Stops
.51
Suspicious Object
Fits Description
.57
.06
Casing
Other
Drug Transaction
Criminal Appearances
Trespass Stops
.30
Crime Location
Fits Description
.57
.27
Other
Evasive/Furtive
Drug Transaction
Criminal Appearances
QOL Stops
.16
Criminal Appearances
Fits Description
.21
.05
Suspicious Object

% Model
Improvement
15.6%

11.8%

14.3%

79.3%

11.8%

90.0%
31.3%

* Negative binomial regressions, population-averaged models with fixed effects for precinct and time, and AR(1) covariance.

Appendix A. UF-250 Form

